Relocating labour-intensive manufacturing firms from China to Southeast Asia: a preliminary investigation by Chun Yang
Relocating labour‑intensive 
manufacturing firms from China to Southeast 
Asia: a preliminary investigation
Chun Yang*
Background
China’s rise as a “world factory” since the late 1970s has been attributed to the strategic 
coupling of local assets, particularly low–cost labour in the coastal regions, viz. Pearl 
River Delta (PRD) and Yangtze River Delta (YRD) in the Global Production Networks 
(GPNs) driven by transnational corporations (TNCs)’s cross-border investment. Since 
2000, these export-led regions have encountered unprecedented challenges, especially 
the rising cost of labour, land, shortage of labour, policy changes, and shrinking mar-
ket demand of western advanced economies, which have engendered spatial relocation 
of labour-intensive manufacturing firms from China to lower-cost locations, e.g. inland 
China and neighbouring Southeast Asia. Compared with numerous studies on the inter-
nal industrial relocation within China, i.e. from the coastal regions, e.g. the PRD and 
YRD to the mid and Western provinces and cities, e.g. Wuhan, Chongqing and Chengdu 
(He and Wang 2012; Yang 2009, 2013), little has been conducted on the cross-border 
production expansion to the neighbouring Southeast Asian countries, e.g. Vietnam, 
Indonesia and Cambodia. In the meanwhile, these Southeast Asian countries have 
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implemented proactive policies to attract the inflows of TNCs with various government 
initiatives in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. The ongoing industrial 
relocation of China-based “world factory” in the rise of “Global South” particularly and 
its implications for the restructuring of global and regional production networks remain 
understudied in the literature.
The 2000s, especially the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, witnessed the 
shift of markets for final products from Global North to South, particularly emerging 
economies in Asia, e.g. China and India (Cattaneo et al. 2010). Recent studies have high-
lighted significant and new trends of how global production networks and global value 
chains are restructuring the organization (Yeung and Coe 2015). Notably, GPNs and 
GVCs are becoming geographically more consolidated, which reflects the rise of large 
emerging economies (Gereffi 2014). Known initially as BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and 
China), the emerging economies now include a diverse array of “growth economies” 
such as Mexico, South Korea, Turkey, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam, which 
offer seemingly inexhaustible pools of relatively low-wage workers, highly capable 
expor-oriented manufacturers, abundant raw material, and sizeable domestic markets 
(O’Neill 2011). Emerging economies have turned into major production centres world-
wide, although their specific roles in GPNs and GVCs may vary according to their open-
ness to trade and foreign investment, and other strategic consideration. Nevertheless, 
little has been conducted to make connections between spatial relocation of production 
networks of TNCs and the rise of emerging markets in the Global South, in comparison 
with the relative decline of the US and EU as prevalent external markets for the prod-
ucts in China and Southeast Asian countries. It is worthwhile for noting that the indus-
trial relocation has been undergone in the acrimonious politics of the “South China Sea” 
disputes. While politics, particularly the international political factors do matter in the 
industrial relocation, the current study has put more emphasis on the analysis of eco-
nomic geographical factors, while remain that of political factors in future studies. The 
combination of economic and political factors will definitely make the scenario of pro-
duction landscape complicated, which warrants for more comprehensive and systematic 
investigation on the agenda for future research.
This paper attempts to contribute to the literature through investigating cross-border 
relocation of labour-intensive TNCs from China to Southeast Asia since 2000. Special 
emphasis is put on the reorganization of regional production networks in East Asia and 
Southeast Asia induced by the industrial relocation. Based on intensive field investiga-
tion and in-depth interviews in the PRD as origin of industrial relocation and selected 
countries such as Cambodia, Vietnam and Indonesia as sample destinations in Southeast 
Asia, it sheds light on Southeast Asian countries as emerging locations for the expanded 
industrial space beyond the coastal regions in China’s “world factory”.
Research design and methods
Since 2000, particularly at the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis, the global econ-
omy has entered a new era with the rise of contending centres of economic and politi-
cal power, particularly in East Asia (Cattaneo et  al. 2010). Over the last two decades, 
the concepts of global commodity chains (GCC), global value chains (GVC) and global 
production networks (GPN) have become popular analytical frameworks with which to 
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explore the changing landscapes of economic globalization and its associated develop-
mental outcomes (Coe et  al. 2004, 2008; Gereffi et  al. 2005). From the GPN perspec-
tive, firms in developing countries have attempted to engage in “strategic coupling” with 
GPNs to foster regional development (Yeung 2009). Recent literature, however, argues 
that the concept is not explanatory enough and does not sufficiently take into account 
decoupling and recoupling dynamics (MacKinnon 2012). In the changing geographical 
political economy of GPNs, increasing attention has been paid to the negative effects, 
or “dark sides” of strategic coupling of export-oriented regions, e.g. over reliance on 
the Western markets (Henderson and Nadvi 2011). Recently, the so-called “GPN 2.0” 
was proposed to offer novel theoretical insights into why and how the organization of 
global production networks varied significantly within and across different industries, 
sectors and economies (Coe and Yeung 2015). Moreover, the concepts of “decoupling” 
and “recoupling” have been recently proposed to refine the strategic coupling of regional 
economies in GPNs (MacKinnon 2012). As put Yeung and Coe (2015), “Processes of 
decoupling and recoupling can take place thereafter, incorporating new groups and/or 
recombining existing groups of regional and GPN actors”. By examining India’s phar-
maceutical industry, Horner (Horner 2014) demonstrated that the dynamic process of 
strategic coupling, decoupling and recoupling between 1947 and 2005 enabled India to 
become one of the world’s leading centres for pharmaceutical production. MacKinnon 
(2012) contends that decoupling is a more likely outcome after structural coupling in 
those places such as old industrial regions in Western Europe and North America. Simi-
lar to the thesis of decoupling, “disarticulation” has emerged in the severe consequences 
of regional lock-in in the apparel industry in La Laguna, Mexico (Bair and Werner 2011).
Over the past decades, countries in East Asia have been successful in joining global 
and regional production networks, which has led to a so-called “triangular trade” pat-
tern (Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez 2015): China as an export base to assemble com-
ponents and parts imported from Asian NIEs and Japan into final goods for external 
markets in the US and EU. Moreover, an increasing share of trade in consumption goods 
has become reoriented over the past 5  years (2009–2014): more final goods are now 
being exported to countries within East Asia (Helble 2014). The rise of Asia, particularly 
China, has turned into not only a low cost global supply base for advanced economies, 
but, more importantly, has created new demand for goods and services previously des-
tined for consumption only in advanced economies (Kaplinsky et al. 2011). The thesis of 
“decoupling”, or the trade of East Asia’s delinking from the American and European mar-
kets and “recoupling” with emerging markets within East Asia, has aroused wide atten-
tion since the early 2000s, particularly at the onset of the global financial crisis (Pula 
and Peltonen 2009). The notion of “decoupling” postulates that East Asia has become a 
self-contained economic entity for maintaining its own growth dynamism independent 
of the traditionally developed markets. During the period of 1995 and 2008, the share 
of high-income countries in total value-added generated by manufacturing industry 
declined from 74 to 56 %, and the share of Japan and the East Asian NIEs declined from 
21 to 11  %. During the same period, emerging economies have increased their shares 
of valued added in manufacturing by 18  %. China alone is responsible for half of this 
increase, with its global share rising rapidly from 4 to 13 % (Timmer et al. 2014).
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The export-oriented development in East Asia’s newly industrialized economies (NIEs) 
was initially designated as a model for China in the late 1970s, and, particularly, the PRD 
and YRD at a later stage. The export-oriented production regions in China have ben-
efited from the “strategic coupling” process of regional assets (cheap labour and land) 
and the strategic needs of GPNs (cost-down and time-to-market) through conducive 
institutions (processing trade regime) (Yang 2012). However, since 2000, the export-led 
regions have encountered unprecedented challenges at global, national and local levels, 
including the surge of labour costs, stringent labour and environment regulation, appre-
ciation of Renminbi and decreasing orders from the sluggish demand of the core West-
ern markets (Yang 2007). Prior to the 2008 global financial crisis, Guangdong provincial 
government initiated a so-called ‘Empty the Cage for New Birds’ strategy, through which 
labour-intensive and low-end TNCs as ‘old birds’ are forced to move out of the PRD to 
the less developed areas, while the PRD would be replaced by high-tech value-added 
industries as ‘new birds’ (Yang 2012, 2014). The outbreak of the 2008 global financial 
crisis has accelerated the spatial “fix” of the “world factory” (Zhang 2014) characterized 
by relocation of export-oriented production to lower-cost locations, including intra-
regional relocation in the YRD (Wei 2015), inter-regional relocation (Yang 2009) and 
expansion to inland China (He et al. 2011), as well as neighbouring Southeast Asia (Zhu 
and Pickles 2014). Taking the apparel industry as a case, Zhu and Pickles (2014) describe 
the restructuring process as “go up”, “go west” and “go out”. Existing literature on indus-
trial relocation has primarily focused on internal industrial relocation within China, lit-
tle has been conducted on cross-border production expansion to Southeast Asia, the 
effects of which on the restructuring of global and regional production network lack 
comprehensive and updated investigation.
The notion of the “Factory Asia” first emerged as a manufacturing power in the 1960s, 
when Japan began exporting electronics and consumer goods, followed by the Asian 
Newly Industrializing Economies, namely Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong 
Kong. By the 1980s Japanese firms were building plants across Southeast Asia. China 
became the most attractive location of the Factory Asia since its implementation of 
opening and reform in late 1970s. Asia’s contribution to the global manufacturing out-
put increased from 26.5  % in 1990 to 46.5  % in 2013. Among which, China accounts 
for half of the Asia’s manufacturing output. In the meanwhile, Asia’s share of the global 
trade in intermediate inputs—the goods that are eventually assembled into final prod-
ucts for exports to the advanced Western markets—rose from 14 % in 2000 to 50 % in 
2012 (The Economist 2015).
However, since 2000, the low-end manufacturing in China’s “world factory” has been 
weakened by the afore-mentioned rising labour costs in China, state initiatives of indus-
trial upgrading and the unabated appreciation of the Renminbi. This will be especially 
true for the many cost-sensitive foreign companies currently operating in China. The 
illustration below shows how the unit labour cost in China continued to increase rap-
idly from 2008 onward, despite the decline in external demand caused by the global eco-
nomic downturn. Unit labour cost in China has undergone a much steeper climb than 
that in Southeast Asia’s other exporter economies (Fig. 1). The incipient rise of Southeast 
Asia offers a big labour pool with low wages and mostly market-friendly policy environ-
ments. The average factory worker in China earns $27.50 per day, compared with $8.60 
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in Indonesia and $6.70 in Vietnam. Demography is another advantage: China may be 
ageing rapidly, but South-East Asia’s workforce is largely below the global median age of 
29.7 (The Economist 2015). While the minimum wage levels in China may appear to be 
in line with other ASEAN countries, such as Thailand (US$230) and Indonesia (US$228), 
China’s average wage is a lot higher, often double the minimum wage. As an indication, 
the average wage in Southern China is already above US$400 per month, almost twice 
that in Thailand or Indonesia and triple the level in Vietnam (Hong Kong Trade Devel-
opment Council 2013). Apart from the increased wages, China has also seen a number 
of its other operational costs rise, making basic manufacturing less attractive financially. 
China has a labour force of more than 800 million, the largest in the world. It is more 
than double the ASEAN’s combined workforce of just over 300 million. The combined 
ASEAN workforce, though, is sufficiently large (and sufficiently skilled) to tempt foreign 
companies should they consider relocating some of their basic manufacturing away from 
China. In recent years, China’s pace of workforce expansion has slowed, increasing at 
no more than one per cent a year since the beginning of the global financial crisis. Over 
the same period, most ASEAN countries have seen their labour forces expand at a faster 
rate, on average double that of China (Table 1).
Since 2000, especially in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, there has 
witnessed the spatial relocation of labour-intensive manufacturing firms from the 
coastal China to Southeast Asia. For instance, Myanmar’s clothing exports jumped 
from $700 m to $1.7 billion between 2011 and 2014. H&M, a European retailer, recently 
shifted sweater production from China to the Myanmar Century Liaoyuan Knitted Wear 
factory, a Chinese-run facility in outer Yangon (HKTDC 2013). Taiwan-based con-
tract manufacturer Foxconn signed a letter of intention 2011 to invest up to $1 billion 
in Jakarta Province in Indonesia as it seeks to diversify production away from China. 
The letter states that the city has committed to provide a 200-hectare plot of land in 
Marunda, Central Jakarta, for the upcoming factory. The agreement was signed jointly 
by Foxconn chairman Terry Gou and Jakarta governor Joko Widodo. Foxconn opera-
tions in Indonesia would focus on the domestic market of around 240 million people, 
Fig. 1 Comparison of unit labour cost in US, China, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam, 1999–2012. Source: 
HKTDC (2013)
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he said, but the company could also export to the rest of the South-east Asian region. 
In 2013 Japanese investment doubled in South-East Asia and shrank by 40 % in China 
(The Economist 2015). Moreover, the state-designated economic rebalancing of China 
reflected in the National 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2016), coupled with the govern-
ment’s increased emphasis on industrial upgrades for higher-value production, has 
diminished China’s appeal as a location for low-cost, labour-intensive manufacturing. 
The scenario of “China makes all” has gradually come under challenges. Furthermore, 
rising domestic consumption in China has helped TNCs relocated in neighbouring 
regions. As the purchasing power of Chinese buyers grows, the average distance trav-
elled by consumer-goods exports is changing, depending on whether they are shipped 
from Asia, Europe or North America. From 2008 to 2012, the average journey length for 
Asian exports fell by 4.5 %, while those from Europe and North America rose by 25.9 and 
13.7  %, respectively. That makes transportation costs cheaper for Asian factories (The 
Economist 2015). While with well recognition of the influential political factors, i.e. the 
“South China Sea” disputes, the comprehensive analysis of political issues will remain 
in another study in future. Instead, this paper puts more emphasis on economic geo-
graphical aspects of cross-border relocation of manufacturing production from China to 
Southeast Asia.
At the above conceptual and empirical backdrops, this study develops a multi-scalar 
framework (Fig.  2) to examine the ongoing cross-border relocation of TNCs, particu-
larly labour-intensive firms in garment and electronics industry from the PRD in coastal 
China to selected Southeast Asian countries, e.g. Indonesia, Vietnam and Cambodia. 
Since 2005, the China-based TNCs engaging in labour-intensive, environment-pollut-
ing, low value-added industries have been designated by the Chinese government as 
major targets for industrial restructuring (Yang 2012). Garment and electronics indus-
tries, two typical export-oriented sectors in China, are selected to examine the industrial 
relocation and expansion of cross-border production networks to Southeast Asia. As the 
largest manufacturer of electronics products in the world, China accounted for 41.4 % of 
the world total in 2013, much higher than the EU who is number two at 23 %. In terms 
of the garment industry, China’s exports accounted for 36 % of the world total in 2013, 
which is higher than the EU at 25 % (UN Comtrade dataset). Moreover, China’s share 
Table 1 Comparison of  labour force in selected Asian economies (millions). Source: com-
piled according to the World Bank database
CAGR compound annual growth rate
ASEAN 2008 2009 2010 2011 CAGR (%)
Laos 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.2 2.7
Cambodia 7.6 7.8 8.0 8.1 2.3
Malaysia 11.5 11.7 12.0 12.2 1.9
Myanmar 27.2 27.6 28.0 28.4 1.5
Philippines 36.7 37.8 38.7 39.7 2.6
Thailand 39.2 38.6 39.4 39.8 0.5
Vietnam 49.3 50.2 51.1 52.0 1.8
Indonesia 114.3 116.4 118.0 119.8 1.6
Total 288.9 293.2 298.3 303.2 1.6
China 786.8 793.8 799.5 806.0 0.8
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of exports of electronic final products manufactured in Southeast Asia increased from 
1.4 % in 2000 to 13 % in 2012, while that of the US dropped from 32.9 to 17 % during the 
same period. Indonesia, Cambodia and Vietnam are chosen as cases because they have 
experienced rapid transformation as emerging players in regional production networks 
in Southeast Asia and become major destinations of industrial relocation of China’s 
manufacturing. For instance, Cambodia has emerged into the region’s textile manufac-
turing centre, with more than 85 % of its exports made up of garments. In 2013, Cambo-
dia and Vietnam accounted for 21 and 29 %, respectively, of China’s imports of apparel 
from ASEAN. Vietnam alone represented for 43  % of China’s imports of textile from 
ASEAN. Case studies of typical TNCs which have engaged in industrial relocation from 
coastal China to Southeast Asia will be conducted to better understand the inter-firm 
and intra-firm linkages in the expansion and reorganization of production and trade net-
works. It is worthwhile for noting that in the open-ended interviews, questions related 
to the social, linguistic and cultural differences between the selected ASEAN countries/
cities have been put forward to the interviewees to elaborate how they have influenced 
on the effectiveness of the process and patterns of industrial relocation and expansion of 
the “world factory” from China to Southeast Asia.
Results and discussions
Over the past decades, China has come to be regarded as the undisputed global work-
shop for making a plethora of finished goods for global consumption, especially in the 
G2 markets of the US and the EU. This has been helped, in no small measure, by the 
rapid economic development of China following its implementation of its big bang eco-
nomic reforms in line with the country’s accession to World Trade Organization (WTO) 
membership back in late 2001. As China phased in all of its liberalisation commitments 
to further open up its market to the world in the late 2000s, it concomitantly inspired 
Plant closure Registered 
Unregistered
Forms Partial relcoation 
Complete relocation
Initiatives Government-intervened
Business-initiated
Relocation 
Inside Guangdong 
Location Neighbouring provinces
Neighbouring countries
Manufacturing
Sectors R&D
New Subsidiary
Upgrading from OEM to ODM/OBM
In-site upgrading/transformation Forms Diversification: manufacturing to services
Tranformation: from export to domestic sell
Fig. 2 Spatial relocation of TNCs from China: an evolutionary framework. Source: adapted based on Yang 
(2012)
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increased confidence among TNCs as to increasing their China-bound investment as 
well as to relocating a portion of their production to the country. This resulted in a veri-
table transformation of China’s economy. This has also catalysed the development in Asia 
of an integrated production base for the global supply chain. This has seen non-China 
Asia increasingly sending its intermediate goods to China for final assembly before ship-
ping to overseas markets. This practice, in terms of export share, roughly doubled to 
about 16 per cent between 2001 and 2009. China’s exports of consumer goods accounted 
for 30 % of overall export growth, compared to around five to 10 % in other Asian econo-
mies over the decade to 2009 (Fig. 3). On the other hand, those exporter countries were 
heavily engaged in the trading of intermediate goods, particularly those parts and com-
ponents used in the production of electronic products, which underlines Asia’s growing 
intra-regional trade.
As in many other emerging markets, a number of ASEAN countries, despite boasting 
a low-cost production environment and attractively low labour wages, faces a number 
of shortcomings. Aside from general wage levels, there is a number of other relocation 
considerations, including land costs, the availability of skilled labour, utility costs, infra-
structure concerns, the complexity and transparency of government regulations and 
uncertainties as to tax regimes. A prime example of these additional concerns would 
be Myanmar. As a relatively undeveloped and recently emerging economy, it has the 
undoubted appeal of an average wage level less than half of that in Thailand or Indonesia. 
On the down side, its public electricity supply is limited just to 5 h in the dry season. The 
ASEAN-5 countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam) have 
all initiated a number of reforms aimed at optimising FDI inflows. These have centred 
on those trade and investment measures aimed at making it easier for foreign companies 
to start businesses, trade and enforce contracts. It is believed that these improvements 
will be seen as a clear response to longstanding calls for greater transparency in the 
Fig. 3 Ranking for ease of doing business in Asia (2013). Source: HKTDC (2013)
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administration of business regulations across all of these five emerging markets. Obvi-
ously, labour cost is not a single factor and actor in determining cross-border relocation 
of labour-intensive manufacturing. Furthermore, market opportunities and paradigm 
shift of markets are also important factors in the process.
Nevertheless, the factors of business environment are more complicated than labour 
cost and market dynamics, salient social, political and cultural factors do matter in pro-
duction relocation to the Southeast Asian countries. Notably, the World Bank currently 
ranks ease of doing business in 185 economies. These ratings are based on 10 individ-
ual criteria, including starting a business, dealing with construction permits, securing 
credit, protecting investors, access to electricity, registering property, paying taxes, trad-
ing across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency issues. If these figures 
were abstracted out for Asia, and China was adopted as the benchmark when consider-
ing relocation to an ASEAN-5 economy, it would appear that Vietnam is now closely 
behind China, with both Malaysia and Thailand also moving seemingly well out in front 
(Fig. 3). Looking more closely at the 2013 criteria-specific rankings, China falls behind 
the Philippines when it comes to securing an electricity supply, taking three times as 
long (i.e. 145 days versus 50 days). Although China was the world’s leading exporter in 
2012, it is seen to be cumbersome to trade across its borders than it is in either Indo-
nesia or the Philippines. The problems largely stem from Chinese regulations requiring 
more export documents than competing nations, thus considerably lengthening the lead 
time for exporters working in the country.
Given ASEAN’s economic diversity and its growing capacity, across the board, for han-
dling sophisticated production of an expanding scale, it seems likely that no one ASEAN 
country will be the solitary beneficiary of any mass industrial relocation from China. 
Overall, much will depend on the exact requirements of the production facilities being 
relocated, as well as the perceived ease of doing business in any given ASEAN country. 
Despite this, Vietnam looks set to have considerable appeal, given its comparatively low 
wage costs and its reliable labour supply. With all the focus on facilities being relocated 
from China, it should be remembered that there are already signs of existing ASEAN-
based industrial operations considering a move from one of the region’s countries to 
another. In particular, there have been reports indicating that a number of Thai-based 
garment companies are considering relocating their plants to Myanmar. These devel-
opments have been fuelled by Thailand’s adoption of a daily minimum wage of about 
US$10 as of January 2013.
Aside from manufacturing low cost items, such as in the flourishing garment indus-
tries of Cambodia and Vietnam, ASEAN has also become progressively more capable of 
handling more sophisticated manufacturing on an increasingly large scale. This is largely 
down to the growing availability of talented workers and the continual influx of FDI ear-
marked for higher-end manufacturing projects. This has seen Thailand emerge as an 
automotive manufacturing hub, with Indonesia also succeeding in attracting investment 
from abroad in the motoring sector. In 2012, electronic products overtook garments as 
Vietnam’s leading export sector. This was largely due to increased output and exports for 
MNCs from the US and East Asia. Beneficiaries of this have included Samsung’s factory 
in the Bac Ninh Province, adjacent to Hanoi. This now produces more than 100 mil-
lion smartphones and tablet units annually, amounting to an export value of US$12.5 
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billion in 2012. As part of a plan to expand its business and production capabilities in 
Vietnam, March 2013 saw Samsung begin the construction of its second industrial com-
plex in the country. The new facility represents an overall investment of US$2 billion by 
the company and is based in Thai Nguyen Province, some 2 h’ drive time from Hanoi. 
While Thailand remains a key ASEAN investment target for Japan, despite the disrup-
tions caused by flooding, Japanese companies have also stepped up investment in other 
ASEAN countries, notably Indonesia and Vietnam. This is largely in a bid to seek alter-
native production bases to hedge against their exposure in China. In the case of Viet-
nam, Japan’s inward FDI in the country doubled in 2012, despite an overall double-digit 
decline in net FDI inflows.
Based on the field investigation and in-depth interviews with senior managers of 
TNCs which have engaged in cross-border relocation from China to Southeast Asia, 
this paper argues that the “China plus” strategy has been widely adopted by TNCs in 
spatial expansion and reorganization of production networks beyond China to selected 
Southeast Asian countries. In consequence, a China-ASEAN regional production 
networks has been in emerging, which will be fostered in the institutional context of 
China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement effective from 1 January 2010. While some US 
companies are reportedly reconsidering onshore production in light of growing operat-
ing costs in China, others are planning to relocate production to Southeast Asia. Despite 
this, concerns over a wholesale relocation from China would appear overblown, espe-
cially taking into account Chinese workers’ higher productivity, the comparative sophis-
tication of China’s industrial clusters and the country’s undoubted capacity to rapidly 
mobilise and utilise a large amount of workers to meet substantial international orders. 
Although, as referenced earlier, China’s inward FDI surpassed the US$100 billion mark 
in 2010, this inflow decelerated somewhat in 2012. Despite this slowdown, FDI will likely 
remain robust in the years ahead, particularly those funds targeting China’s domestic 
market and the production of high-value exports, as opposed to those low-value prod-
ucts where manufacture is likely to be relocated to other regions.
It is worthwhile for noting that apart from Southeast Asian countries, Africa has 
turned to be alternative locations for the relocation and expansion of labour-intensive 
manufacturing from China in recent years (Hong and Hong 2006). The sectoral compo-
sition, ownerships and sources of origins of the firms to Southeast Asia and Africa are 
found quite different. Comparative studies which take into account the economic, politi-
cal, social and cultural factors are thus in need. Moreover, it is essential to develop a 
multi-scalar and multiple locational analytical framework to better understand the com-
prehensive and complicated process and dynamics of cross-border production reloca-
tion and expansion from China to the other parts of the world. More in-depth issues, e.g. 
adaptation and localization of foreign-invested and China-based manufacturing firms in 
Southeast Asian countries warrant for further research.
To summarize, the spatial relocation of TNCs from coastal China to the neighbouring 
Southeast Asian countries and restructuring their production networks have three major 
targets. Firstly, to cut down the costs. As the aforementioned, workers in the selected 
Southeast Asian countries generally are less expensive to hire than Chinese employ-
ees. By 2010, China already had become the third-most-expensive labor market in Asia. 
Moreover, labor costs have continued their upward trajectory while with difficulties in 
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sufficient supply. Second, to diversify risks in the cross-border production. By taking 
“China plus” strategy, TNCs could geographically disperse the production across sev-
eral markets to ensure producers less vulnerable to supply chain disruptions, currency 
fluctuations and tariff risks in various markets. Thirdly, to explore access to new markets 
in Southeast Asia with the rise of consumers. Nevertheless, when making decision on 
the location for companies to diversify away from China is not a simple one, with each 
country presenting its own advantages and challenges as discussed earlier. The recou-
pling and decoupling of developing countries and regions in the GPNs have turned into 
a daunting challenges for TNCs in the changing global and local dynamics.
Conclusion
This paper has conducted a preliminary exploration of the ongoing cross-border reloca-
tion of TNCs from coastal China to the Southeast Asian countries since 2000. It eluci-
dates that the spatial expansion of China’s “world factory” from coastal China regions to 
selected Southeast Asian countries could help the strategic coupling of regional devel-
opment of the Southeast Asian countries to the GPNs. With the relocated TNCs from 
China, Southeast Asian countries have gradually incorporated into the GPNs. The sub-
sequent effects on the reorganization of regional production networks have emerged, 
in which the intra-regional cooperation and integration has been strengthened. There 
witnessed the emergence of China-Southeast Asian regional production networks in the 
restructuring of global manufacturing and production networks. Nevertheless, as pre-
dicted by The Economist (2015), on one country in the ASEAN with 630 million people 
or less than half of China’s population, will replace China’s role in “Factory Asia”. But the 
region will benefit if better integrated. ASEAN countries have made progress in remov-
ing tariffs, especially on goods, but non-tariff barriers on consumer goods, electronics 
and automobile industry remain high. The same as the restrictions on services, invest-
ment, labour mobility and customs regulations. According to the McKinsey Global 
Institute, the import/export costs in ASEAN (clearing customs, port fees, inland trans-
portation) are 24 % higher than China, and the time for customs procedures in ASEAN 
takes 66 % longer than in the OECD countries.
Through relocating labour-intensive manufacturing to the Southeast Asian countries, 
to what extent that China could hopefully upgrade its positions from the low-end in 
the GPNs warrant comprehensive investigation. According to the International Feder-
ation of Robotics, China purchased 20 % of the robots made in 2013 and became the 
biggest market for robots in the world. Foxconn, the Taiwanese firm as the largest con-
tract manufacturer for Iphones and employed over a million workers in China forecast 
that robots will complete 70 % of its assembly-line work within 3 years. The interaction 
between cross-border relocation of labour-intensive manufacturing firms from coastal 
Chin to Southeast Asian countries and technological upgrading in China warrants 
comprehensive investigation. Moreover, this study sheds light on China’s growing mar-
ket for the expanded production and trade networks in East and Southeast Asia, which 
used to mainly target the Western core markets. The findings have not only fostered 
the theoretical development of GPNs with the articulation of emerging host markets 
in Global South into the conceptual framework of GPNs, but also fundamental impli-
cations for concerned business and governments for policy making. More empirical 
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studies in different countries and different industries related to the cross-border reloca-
tion of TNCs from China to Southeast Asian countries could provide more comprehen-
sive understanding and empirical evidence to the reorganization of regional and global 
production networks in the interconnected global economy.
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